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THE FUTURE OF GUINN V. LEGISLATURE
Troy L. Atkinson*
United States Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson best articulated the
human element, giving life to the Nation's Highest Court, when he stated: "We
are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final."' With the Legislature eventually approving a balanced budget by a
supermajority vote, the Nevada Supreme Court's ruling in Guinn v. Legisla-
ture, will stand, at least for now, because it is "final." 2 However, the Guinn
ruling is far from "infallible." The circumstances leading to the Court's deci-
sion, as well as the court's logic, have created a dangerous precedent that could
extend far beyond Nevada. For example, this potential precedent was alluded
to by United States District Court Judge Roger Hunt during the en banc hearing
following the Guinn decision. When Judge Hunt asked defense counsel if the
Guinn logic would apply beyond the Nevada Senate Bill 6 ("SB 6") budget
proposal and allow the Legislature to ignore the supermajority vote in any situ-
ation requiring an increase in public revenue to support education, defense
counsel responded: "[w]e don't know if the ruling means more [than SB 6], we
only know that it does not mean less."3 Unfortunately, the ruling does mean
"more." And the future implications, along with the flawed judgment of this
holding, necessitate a reconsideration of the Nevada Supreme Court's decision.
I. BACKGROUND
The extraordinary outcome of Guinn v. Legislature arose from not-so-
extraordinary circumstances. The Nevada Constitution requires the Governor
to propose a state budget and submit the proposal to the Legislature.4 The
Legislature must then approve a balanced budget and appropriate the money
needed for all state government expenditures for the next two fiscal years.5
Among specific expenditures, the Legislature must support and maintain the
public school systems.6 The state's estimated expenditures for the biennium
must be defrayed with an annual tax.7
The dispute in Guinn v. Legislature centered on the number of votes
needed to pass a budget proposal when the proposal requires an increase in
public revenue to support the public education system. Under normal circum-
stances, a simple majority of each legislative house is required to pass "every
* J.D., University of San Diego School of Law (2003).
1 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
2 Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003).
3 Angle v. Legislature of Nev., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (D. Nev. 2003) (en banc).
I NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 2(3).
5 Id. art. IX, § 2.
6 Id. art. XI, § 6.
7 Id. art. IX, § 2.
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bill or joint resolution."8 However, in 1996, Nevada voters approved, by an
overwhelming majority, a Constitutional amendment requiring a two-thirds, or
supermajority, vote of each house to "pass a bill or joint resolution which cre-
ates, generates, or increases any public revenue in any form, including but not
limited to taxes, fees, assessments and rates, or changes in the computation
bases for taxes, fees, assessments, and rates." 9 Simply put, anytime the Legis-
lature seeks to raise taxes, such a proposal must pass with a two-thirds vote.
In 1997, 1999, and 2001, the Legislature was able to provide funds for
education under a simple majority because the State operated under a balance
surplus and no major tax increases were required. Citing drastic economic
changes, the Governor requested $980 million dollars in new revenue to bal-
ance the proposed budget for the 2003-2005 biennium. The proposed tax
increases required the Legislature to approve revenue increases, designed to
support the public education system, by a supermajority vote pursuant to
Nevada Constitution, Article 4, Section 18(2).
II. GOVERNOR GUINN FILES FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
While the SB 6 budget proposal gained the support of a legislative major-
ity, the Legislature could not pass a budget proposal by a supermajority vote in
its general session.'° Two subsequent special legislative sessions were held in
an attempt to reach a compromised budget proposal that would draw a
supermajority vote." During the second special session, Governor Kenny
Guinn took the extraordinary step of suing the Legislature. 12 The Governor
petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, declaring the
Legislature in violation of the Nevada Constitution for not complying with their
duty to approve a balanced budget and provide appropriations to fund public
education. 13 After reviewing the governor's petition, the Nevada Supreme
Court determined that "the Legislature has failed to fulfill its constitutional
mandate because of the conflict among several provisions of the Nevada Con-
stitution."'" Specifically, the Court found that the supermajority voting
requirement prevented the Legislature from passing a budget proposal, thus
providing appropriations to support the public education system. 15 This
"budget crisis," according to the court, was caused by a conflict between the
Legislature's "constitutional obligation to fund education and the constitutional
provisions requiring a simple majority vote to enact appropriations bills but a
two-thirds majority to generate or increase public revenue to fund those
appropriations." '
6
Under Nevada law, when constitutional provisions conflict, the Nevada
Supreme Court must interpret the Constitution according to established con-
8 Id. art. IV, § 18(1).
9 Id. art. IV, § 18(2).
'o Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269, 1273 (Nev. 2003).
'1 Id. at 1273.
12 Id. at 1272.
13 Id. at 1272.
14 Id. at 1272.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1274.
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structional canons.17 Proceeding under constructional canons, which provide
that "specific provisions take precedence over general provisions," 18 the court
determined that the supermajority vote was a "general procedural require-
ment,""9 while the mandate to support the public education system was a "spe-
cific substantive" right.2 ° The court supported its classification of education as
a "specific provision" by referring to sections of the Nevada Constitution that
specifically mention the Legislature's duties to "encourage" education and pro-
vide a "uniform system of common schools."'" Therefore, the court deter-
mined, if "the procedural two-thirds revenue vote requirement in effect denies
the public its expectation of access to public education, then the two-thirds
requirement must yield to the specific substantive educational right."2 The
court then directed the Legislature to "proceed expeditiously" with efforts to
approve a budget balance "under simple majority rule."'23 This controversial
relief was not requested by any party named in the litigation, specifically, and
most importantly, the Governor.
III. RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES DIsTRICT COURT
Pursuant to the court's ruling, the Nevada State Assembly subsequently
"passed" the SB 6 budget proposal by a majority (26 to 16), but by less than a
two-thirds vote.24 Prior to the Nevada Senate's consideration of SB 6, the
Assembly members who voted against the proposal, along with individual state
voters, filed an application for a temporary restraining order in the United
States District Court. 5 Plaintiffs also filed a complaint for injunctive and
declaratory relief under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Plaintiffs argued that the "passage of SB 6 without
a 'supermajority' vote diluted the votes of the Legislator Plaintiffs, and diluted
the representation" the voter Plaintiffs "were entitled" to, "both in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
27
To "preserve the status quo," the United States District Court issued a
temporary restraining order, preventing the Defendants from passing SB 6
without a supermajority vote.28 Three days later, the district court conducted
an en banc hearing regarding Plaintiffs' Emergency Application for Injunctive
Relief.29 Two days after that, the district court dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.3 °
17 Nevada Mining Ass'n v. Erdoes, 26 P.3d 753, 757 (Nev. 2001).
18 Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1275 (citing SIIS v. Surman, 741 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Nev. 1987)).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1276 (quoting NEV. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Angle v. Legislature of Nev., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1153 (D. Nev. 2003).
25 Id. at 1153.
26 Id. at 1153.
27 Id. at 1154.
28 Id. at 1154.
29 Id. at 1154
30 Id. at 1156.
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In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., the Supreme Court held that district courts
may not find a judgment of a state supreme court in violation of the federal
Constitution.3" That power lies solely with the United States Supreme Court."
Rooker was subsequently expanded in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, where the Court held that "United States District Courts ... do not
have jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases
arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state
court's action was unconstitutional."33 This doctrine became known as the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Although the plaintiffs in the district court did not directly challenge the
Nevada Supreme Court holding, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been
expanded to prevent "lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over any
claim that is 'inextricably intertwined' with the decision of the state court, even
where the party does not directly challenge the merits of the state court's deci-
sion but rather brings an indirect challenge based on constitutional principle."3 4
Accordingly, the district court found that the plaintiffs' requested relief could
not be granted "without voiding the decision of the Nevada Supreme Court."
35
The application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's bar of subject matter
jurisdiction with respect to the individual voter Plaintiffs is less clear because
these Plaintiffs were not parties in the Guinn v. Legislature case.3 6 "Generally,
a plaintiff in a United States District Court who was not a party to the state
court proceeding with which his current federal claims are inextricably inter-
twined is not within the ambit of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine unless that party
directly attacks the state court judgment."37 Thus, the district court could
potentially exercise jurisdiction over the case with respect to the voter Plain-
tiffs. However, the district court found that the claims of the voter Plaintiffs
were identical to the legislator Plaintiffs' claims, and thus "constitute a direct
attack on the decision of the Nevada Supreme Court."3 The court further rea-
soned that even if jurisdiction were established, the voter Plaintiffs' claims do
not state a cause of action because the defendant Legislators were acting "in
compliance with the law as mandated by the highest court of the State of
Nevada.",39 In other words, because the Legislature acted constitutionally,
according to the Nevada Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution, the
United States District Court could not find a constitutional violation without
overturning the Nevada Supreme Court's decision.
31 Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).
32 Id.
13 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983).
14 Angle, 274 F. Supp at 1155 (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 n.4 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
18 Id. at 1156.
39 Id.
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IV. THE FLAWED REASONING OF THE GUiNN COURT
Although the district court did not criticize the Nevada Supreme Court for
the controversial Guinn decision, the district court reinforced an important doc-
trine in its en banc opinion: separation of powers. The district court correctly
elected not to intervene in a situation in which they had no business being
involved. Simply put, the district court abstained from interfering with a legis-
lative process, a decision the Nevada Supreme Court should have made.
While the district court could not have granted the Plaintiffs' requested
relief, the court had other options at its disposal. The court could have delayed
judgment on the injunction, an action that would likely lead the parties to
believe the court would be more likely to grant an injunction. Such tactics
could have influenced the Legislature to pass a proposal under a supermajority
vote in an attempt to avoid the embarrassment of having the federal courts play
"babysitter" to the State. The district court also could have dismissed the case
as unripe since there was no guarantee the Nevada Senate would pass SB 6,
even under a majority vote rule. Dismissing the case as unripe would likely
lead some to believe that if a budget proposal were passed without a
supermajority vote, the district court would grant relief at that time.
It is true that the aforementioned options would be a blatant use of politi-
cal tactics by a judicial entity. However, the commission of this exact sin is
what brought the case before the district court in the first place. The Nevada
Supreme Court's decision to intervene in the legislative process can only be
explained, logically, by political motivations to be the savior of the public edu-
cation system and the slayer of the "budget crisis." Ironically, the Justices'
plan to gain political favor backfired as recall petitions began against every
Justice who signed the majority opinion. If the elected judges of the Nevada
Supreme Court had not been thinking politically, they would not have issued a
writ of mandamus because, quite simply, this case was not ripe for judicial
intervention.
The Guinn court issued its writ of mandamus on July 10, 2003.40 The
court found the legislature in violation of the Nevada Constitution because the
Legislature failed to provide appropriations to support the public education sys-
tem before July 1, 2003, the beginning of the 2004 fiscal year.4 1 However, the
Nevada Constitution does not expressly require the Legislature to pass appro-
priations before the beginning of the fiscal year.42 When the Governor con-
venes a special legislative session, as was the case when Guinn was decided,
the Nevada Constitution permits legislative action to be taken after the regular
legislative session ends.4 3 Thus, the legislature may constitutionally pass a
budget proposal after the regular session ends on July 3, despite the fact that a
new fiscal year has begun. As pointed out by the Guinn court's lone dissenter,
"in the last ten years, the legislature has worked beyond the fiscal year's begin-
ning three times. ' 44
40 Id. at 1153.
41 Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269, 1272 (Nev. 2003).
42 NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 2(2).
43 Id.
4 Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1277 (Maupin, J., dissenting).
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According to Nevada law, the distribution of funds to public schools shall
not occur until August 1 of the fiscal year.45 When the Guinn court issued its
ruling on July 10, 2003, the Legislature still had three weeks remaining to ful-
fill its constitutional mandate to support the public education system. Accord-
ingly, no constitutional violation had occurred; thus, judicial intervention was
improper. Fittingly, the Legislature passed a budget proposal under a
supermajority vote before the August 1 education-fund distribution date.46 The
subsequent constitutional passing of a budget proposal, by solely legislative
means, is proof that the Guinn court, by unnecessarily interfering in the legisla-
tive process, violated the separation of powers doctrine as expressed in the
Nevada Constitution.47 Ironically, when defense counsel argued that judicial
intervention was unnecessary because the Governor and the Legislature have
alternate methods of providing education, the Guinn court responded in a foot-
note: "We have no authority, under the separation of powers doctrine, to com-
pel either the Governor or the Legislature to employ such methods. ' 4
8
The Guinn court further erred in finding that the constitutional provision
mandating that the Legislature support public education and the constitutional
provision requiring a supermajority vote to increase public revenue were
"incompatible with one another."4 9 By the express terms of the provisions, the
supermajority vote only applies to granting appropriations to support the public
education system when taxes or other public revenue will be raised to support
education. The two provisions are not inherently in conflict. In fact, since
Nevada residents voted the two-thirds amendment into the Nevada Constitu-
tion, the Legislature passed budget proposals and provided for education in
1997, 1999, and 2001 under a simple majority vote.5 °
The fact that the two provisions came into conflict in the 2003 legislative
session, for the first time in four legislative sessions, lends overwhelming sup-
port to the argument that the provisions merely have potential conflict, not
inherent incompatibility, as the Guinn court suggests. As previously stated, the
Legislature was able to pass a budget proposal and provide for the education
system by purely legislative means, despite judicial interference, in a manner
that satisfied the will of Nevada voters (a supermajority vote) and allowed edu-
cational appropriations to be distributed by the specified date. Interestingly, the
Guinn court purported to interpret the Nevada Constitution under the guise that
"provisions should be interpreted so as to avoid absurd consequences and not
produce public mischief."'" This author is confident that many legal experts
would agree that "absurd consequences and public mischief' are among the
most apt descriptions of the aftermath of the Guinn decision.
45 NEV. REV. STAT. 387.124(1).
46 Sean Whaley & Ed Vogel, State Legislature: Budget Approved, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., July
22, 2003, at Al.
" NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1(1) ("no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments [legislative, executive, and judicial] shall exercise any
functions, appertaining to either of the others").
48 Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1274, n.9.
49 Id. at 1274.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1275.
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V. THE FuTuRE OF GUINN V. LEGISLATURE?
Despite the many flaws in the Guinn court's reasoning, the future implica-
tions of this case should be of greater concern. Then-California Governor Gray
Davis examined the Guinn precedent during the 2003 California "budget cri-
sis."'5 2 A spokesman for Governor Davis stated that seeking a writ of manda-
mus against the state legislature was "something that we could possibly look at
in the future" to resolve budget proposal impasses.53 This type of misuse of the
judicial branch by state executive departments must be avoided. It is incum-
bent on the Nevada Supreme Court to defuse this potential separation of powers
bomb before it explodes.
Along with the national ramifications of Guinn comes potential local
chaos. As the district court pointed out, the only Court suitable to address the
voting dilution claims of the plaintiff legislators, thereby voiding the Guinn
decision, is the United States Supreme Court.5 4 However, the plaintiffs would
be required to raise an issue of federal question." Since the Nevada Legisla-
ture passed a budget proposal under a supermajority vote, any federal question
the Plaintiff legislators may have raised would now be deemed moot unless the
Nevada Supreme Court ordered a future legislature to ignore the two-thirds
amendment. Unfortunately, this potential future action is exactly the evil that
must be avoided. The Guinn court, by holding that the "procedural" two-thirds
vote amendment must give way to the "substantive" education provision, pro-
vides authority for judicial intervention if a proposal requiring an increase in
public revenue to provide support for the educational system does not com-
mand a two-thirds vote.5 6 Coincidentally, the Guinn court's holding in effect
requires the "procedural" separation of powers provision to also give way to the
"substantive" education provision. Such a circumstance was not the will of the
Nevada taxpayers when they expressed, by an overwhelming vote, that the tax-
payers' legislative representatives must agree by a two-thirds vote before taxes
may be increased. The clear voice of the Nevada taxpayer was silenced by the
Nevada Supreme Court in a situation the court should have avoided. Now the
Nevada Supreme Court must do the honorable thing: admit the Guinn decision
was wrong in order to restore Nevada voters' faith in the election process. The
voters are, after all, the ones who made them Honorable Justices. In short, give
Nevada voters their voice back.
52 Nevada's Judicial Dice-Throwers, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2003, at A14.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000).
56 Id.
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